Sunday, March 4, 2012

And Now for Something Completely Different: The Psychology of Parody

I was a little late onto the Adele bandwagon. She had already released her album 19 and “Rolling in the Deep” was already a single when I finally gave her a shot - okay, I’ll be honest, it took a few listens to 21 before I decided to buy, and I still have some serious qualms about her singing technique; I mean, at only 23 years old, she’s already shredded her voice to the point that she needed surgery to save it. But then, I can’t help but sing along - loudly - anytime her music comes on the radio, and I definitely enjoyed the video for “Rolling in the Deep”, which - though it had some symbols I didn’t completely understand - was much more sensical than other videos I watched around that time.

So you might be surprised to hear that when Key of Awesome, a group who creates parody versions of music videos, made a parody of “Rolling in the Deep”, I loved it. In fact, I enjoy most of Key of Awesome’s videos, even (and perhaps especially) when they make fun of a song I enjoy.

This seems counterintuitive. Why would I enjoy seeing music I love being made fun of? But it’s something I’ve long been aware of about myself and others, and have wondered about occasionally. Today, I finally sat down and began to explore what it is about parody we find so funny.

You may not be surprised to know that humor is very important to human beings. Being able to see the humor in situations has mood-enhancing effects (Strick, Holland, van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2009) and is beneficial to our long-term well-being: Martin and colleagues (see Martin’s book for more information on this research) created a questionnaire to assess individuals’ humor styles: Self-Enhancing (being able to comfort oneself with humor), Affiliative (using humor to build relationships with others), Aggressive (sarcasm or teasing others), and Self-Defeating (using humor at one’s own expense); these styles are related to many measures of psychological well-being, such as satisfaction with life, self-esteem, optimism, and mood. Having high scores for Self-Enhancing and/or Affiliative humor is associated with greater well-being, and having high scores for Aggressive and/or Self-Defeating humor is associated with lower well-being.

Further, Galloway (2010) examined humor styles scores and found that there are four distinct groups: people high on all four styles of humor, people low on all four styles of humor, people high on self-enhancing and affiliative humor and low on aggressive and self-defeating humor, and people high on aggressive and self-defeating humor and low on self-enhancing and affiliative humor. Other researchers have attempted to take the field a step farther, examining what it is about certain situations or stimuli that make them funny. And it seems what it comes down to is setting things up so that perceivers expect a certain outcome… and then giving them something completely different. Strick and colleagues (2009) explain:

“A typical joke contains a set up that causes perceivers to make a prediction about the likely outcome. The punch line violates these expectations, and perceivers look for a cognitive rule that makes the punch line follow from the set up. When this cognitive rule is found, the incongruity is resolved and the joke is perceived as funny.” (p. 575).

In fact, research has shown that when we are unable to make sense of a joke - find a cognitive rule that “makes the punch line follow from the set up” - we find the joke to be less humorous. Which can be seen in practice by anyone who ever told a joke, only to be greeted by silence followed by “I don’t get it”.

Sigmund Freud called this incongruity experiencing the “uncanny” - encountering the unfamiliar in familiar situations. Absurdism is considered to be one form of uncanny-inducing stimuli. Freud argued that uncanniness was a thrilling state of arousal, though others have argued that it can be quite unpleasant - regardless of whether this state of arousal is enjoyable or not, we deal with it as we deal with most states of arousal: engaging in behaviors to make the state of arousal go away or end.

One way we can end or get rid of uncanniness is by perceiving the stimuli to be a joke and responding to it as we do to jokes (e.g., laughter if we find it funny, eye rolls if it’s not funny, etc.). If we don’t realize something is a joke (i.e., we don’t get it), we have to find other ways of dealing with uncanniness, such as by reaffirming our worldview (in fact, reaffirming our worldview is a common way we deal with unpleasant states of arousal - see Terror Management Theory as another example).

Proulx, Heine, and Voh (2010) performed a study on uncanniness with absurdist art, including Monty Python (seriously, sign me up for the line of research using Monty Python as the stimulus). In study 2 of their article, 2 groups of participants read a summary of Monty Python’s Biggles: Pioneer Air Fighter, which was presented as either a joke or an adventure story; a 3rd group read a standard joke. Afterward, they read an unrelated court case and set bail; this was their opportunity to affirm their worldview. Participants set significantly higher bail in the “adventure story” condition than the other two conditions. The authors also found that among participants reading Biggles presented as an adventure story, those who found the story funnier (that is, figured out it was a joke even though it wasn’t presented as such) set lower bond; this effect was not observed in the other two groups. The effect was also not explained by mood, so even though reading something humorous makes people happy (if they get it), it’s not their happiness that explains the bail amount selected.

But the secret to understanding why some people appreciate parody while others do not probably lies in the part of the body that deals with arousal on a fairly regular basis.

Of course. Why? What did you think I was going to say?

Neuroscientists have explored what regions of the brain are activated when we encounter humor. In research on adults, they’ve found that humor results in activation in the part of the brain where the temporal (side), occipital (back), and parietal (top) lobes meet, known as the TOP junction. This part of the brain is used to resolve incongruencies - such as instances where unfamiliar elements are juxtaposed with the familiar (doesn’t this definition bear an uncanny resemblance to, well, the definition of uncanniness?). They also see activation in the mesolimbic system, responsible for processing of rewards (see previous blog post on reward pathways and addiction). That’s right - humor is rewarding, too.

So laugh it up, fuzzball.

~Thoughtfully yours,
Sara

For more laughs, also see Bad Lip Reading and Nice Peter.

Galloway, G. (2010). Individual differences in personal humor styles: Identification of prominent patterns and their associates. Personality and Individual Differences, 48, 563-567.
Proulx, T., Heine, S.J., & Vohs, K.D. (2010). When is the unfamiliar the uncanny? Meaning affirmation after exposure to absurdist literature, humor, and art. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 817-829.
Strick, M., Holland, R.W., van Baaren, R.B., & van Knippenberg, A. (2009). Finding comfort in a joke: Consolatory effects of humor through cognitive distraction. Emotion, 9, 574-578.

Saturday, February 4, 2012

Lies Scientific American Told Me: A Response to Michael Shermer's "Lies We Tell Ourselves"

First, let me say that I generally really enjoy Scientific American articles. They introduce me to new topics, new perspectives, and new writers. They make me think (and I suppose this article I'm about to rip apart also made me think).

I was really disappointed, however, with a recent article by Michael Shermer about Robert Trivers's book, The Folly of Fools, which outlines why human beings evolved the ability to not only be deceptive but to detect deception in others. This theory draws upon evolutionary theory as well as game theory - a theory about how people make strategic decisions when making exchanges with others (and how we use information on others' strategies to influence our own strategy).

The problems with Shermer's article have been well-outlined by the commenters. I urge you to read them, because they are generally articulate and thoughtful - I didn't come across any that appeared to be people "trolling" (see previous blog post for more on Internet trolls). Instead of repeating what these commenters already said so eloquently, I want to focus instead on this issue of lie detection.

Trivers argues that when people are being deceptive, they have three big "tells": nervousness, control (to hide their feelings of nervousness), and cognitive load (which results from having to construct a whole new reality, and has several noticeable effects on behavior, such as fewer hand gestures and speaking in higher-pitches).

People have believed in these tells for a long time (and the media continues to propagate these and similar beliefs). This is why people administering the polygraph and other "lie-detecting instruments" include control questions - questions that people generally answer truthfully - to provide a baseline to which we can compare responses to the questions of interest. If, while lying, they do things like pause longer or speak in higher tones, then voice stress analysis units should be effective at detecting lies, right? And yet, in research, VSA is not found to be effective at differentiating liars from those telling the truth (read a brief summary here), prompting one judge to refer to a particular VSA device as "little better than a sewing machine".

Also doubles as a paper-weight
So perhaps this means we shouldn't depend on computers and other electronic devices. After all, according to Trivers, human have evolved many of these capabilities, and can examine really complex things, like context, that even the smartest computer can't handle. We should instead use people to detect lies. And yet, people are generally very poor at detecting lies on their own (an unpublished meta-analysis mentioned in this article found overall detection deception of 53%, little better than chance). Whenever I teach Psychology & Law, I also do a deception detection activity, where students receive a card telling them to lie or tell the truth to a partner who asks them "What did you do yesterday?" Except for one class that was very good at detecting lies (something like 70%), every class scores right around 50% - chance.

So, as the article linked just above discusses, people have responded by introducing training, especially for people who detect deception as part of their job: police officers, airport security, and so on. That should help, right? A study by Kassin and Fong (1999 - full article here) found that training actually reduced accuracy in detecting deception, but increased confidence. Those who received training were more likely to be wrong than those who did not receive any training, but were more confident that they were right.

This cavalier belief that we can detect deception, and can only improve with greater training, has led to many programs and initiatives meant to bring better deception detectors to places like the airport. And that feeling of confidence in response to training only reinforces the belief that training is a good idea and should be carried out for more personnel. In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States has implemented different programs that provide training to airport security agents to detect when people are hiding something, whether that be drugs, money, or explosives.

One program utilizes micro-expressions. These flickers (lasting about 1/25th of a second) of emotion appear on our faces before we have conscious control over our outward expressions of emotion. These micro-expressions have been well-studied by Dr. Paul Ekman, an expert in human emotion. Some of Dr. Ekman's first research on the issue established the 6 universal human emotions - happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust - that are present across cultures. Based on his research on human emotion generally and micro-expressions specifically, he has developed short training (delivered in as little as 30 minutes).

In as little as 30 minutes, we've convinced TSA agents that, while carrying out various other parts of their jobs, they can catch terrorists.

Dr. Ekman is a brilliant man who has been studying human emotion since the 1950s. This man can probably read any emotional expression, no matter how short, because he knows so much about it. Expecting TSA employees receiving brief training to be able to use these micro-expressions to detect deception at even half the level of someone like Paul Ekman is, I think, expecting a lot.

Do I think these micro-expressions exist and provide cues about lying? Absolutely. But do I think that one can go through brief training, where the micro-expressions are either pre-recorded or, worse yet, acted out, and then walk into the real world, without control or scripts (or feedback on most of the decisions they make about passengers' deception) and use this tactic effectively? Absolutely not.

Remember, in general (unless the airport is performing extra searches on people completely at random) the only people who are stopped and inspected are the ones the TSA agent suspects of being deceptive. This leaves a bunch of people not believed to be deceptive walking right through security, and no feedback on whether they actually were hiding something.

I might be more comfortable with a program that simply clones multiple copies of Paul Ekman to run around our major airports catching liars. Of course, then they'd all want their own TV show.

Thoughtfully yours,
~Sara

Sunday, January 15, 2012

False Research Findings, Truth, and Dirty Jokes

I recently came across an article in PLoS Medicine (Ioannidis, 2005), which concluded that most published research is incorrect. They went on to explain many of the factors that affect whether a study came to the correct conclusion. Though this article was published about seven years ago, it’s been circulating once again, because the points the article makes are still important and relevant. And given some recent, high profile instances of fabricated research findings (see previous blog post), it’s important to keep in mind that simply because a particular finding is not replicable doesn’t automatically mean the researcher(s) made up stuff. There are many logical reasons for why a researcher may find something, through no fault of the researchers or the study design, that simply isn’t true.

I first want to offer the caveat that Ioannidis examined quantitative research. The issues affecting the accuracy of qualitative research are different (I won’t say non-existent, because qualitative research is definitely not infallible, just that these particular results really only apply to studies done where the collected data are numerical).

The underlying concept they’re trying to get at here is validity, defined as truth or, specifically whether the conclusions drawn from a study are a correct, accurate reflection of the topic under study. Though we can never really know the truth, we can get at it through many different types of research, performed in different settings, with different people, etc. Validity is a big concept that encompasses many different types of truth. In research, we think of four types of validity: internal, external, construct, and statistical conclusion.

Most people can understand the concept of validity, but occasionally struggle with the four types. Therefore, I’m going to use one hypothesis to show the various different kinds of validity. This hypothesis comes from a conversation I was having with a friend one day. I told a recently heard, and quite dirty, joke, and afterward, said I should probably keep my telling of dirty jokes to a minimum. To which my friend replied, “You can never have too many dirty jokes.” And of course, being a scientist, I said, “I think we should empirically test that hypothesis.” Little did my friend know, I was only half joking.

So let’s say I wanted to design a study to test this hypothesis. First, I’d need to alter the hypothesis somewhat, unless I’m willing to allow an infinite number of dirty jokes (because I doubt you could actually set up a study to test a “never” contingency), but I’d want to get at the underlying topic of number of allowable dirty jokes. I would have to set up a situation where I could determine at what point someone hearing the dirty jokes requests that they stop. I’d have to pick a certain setting to conduct this study, and have at least two people there (perhaps more): one to tell the dirty jokes, and one to listen and determine when the jokes should stop. I’d have to make sure the joke-teller has enough dirty jokes in his/her repertoire so that the experiment could go on as long as needed - so that the only person calling a halt to the jokes is the listener (or listeners) - but would probably set up a time or number-of-jokes limit so that the participants (and the researchers, for that matter) aren't stuck there forever. I might also want to add another condition, where the joke-teller tells clean jokes; it’s possible that people just get fatigued listening to jokes in general, so we’d want to determine if there’s something different about dirty jokes that may increase or decrease the number a person is willing to hear before saying enough.

All of the above would help us to establish strong internal validity, certainty that our independent variable (the jokes) actually caused our dependent variable (the request to stop telling jokes). If I didn’t have the additional, clean-joke condition, I could still test at what point the person hearing dirty jokes asks they stop, but I’d be less certain it was the dirty jokes causing the request, rather than jokes in general (or just being forced to listen to one person talk for a long time, another potential comparison condition).

Okay, so imagine that I did this study with people hearing dirty jokes from someone (one-on-one, so there was only one joke-teller and one joke-hearer) and other people hearing clean jokes. Let’s say they were randomly assigned to hear either clean or dirty jokes, so that we could expect any additional characteristics affecting our outcome (e.g., poor sense of humor, intolerance for sexual references, etc.) would be evenly divided across groups. And let’s say I found that, on average, people are willing to hear 5 dirty jokes before asking the joke-teller stop (compared to, say, 10 clean jokes).

Does this mean, if I’m at a family reunion, with my rather large family, I know I can probably get away with 5 dirty jokes before someone says, “Okay, Sara, that’s enough. You mean to tell us we helped you through grad school so you could become a female Patton Oswalt?”? Not necessarily. Remember, I did the study in a one-on-one situation. My results may not generalize to group situations. This refers to the notion of external validity, the degree to which the findings of a study can generalize to other people or situations. It doesn’t mean my results are wrong if I find that at my family gathering, I can tell 20 jokes before someone says, “Okay, that’s probably enough.”. It just may mean that groups are different than individual people.

I’d want to do another study using groups instead of individuals, to examine how the effect may differ. I may find that certain groups (e.g., my family) are more tolerant of dirty jokes and allow a greater number to be told than other groups (e.g., my fellow congregants at Sunday mass), and may even find that the same people can be more or less tolerant of dirty jokes depending on our current situation (such as telling jokes to fellow congregants while at church versus telling the same people jokes while we’re out at the bar).

One thing that is important for any of the studies discussed above is how I’m defining my variables. What exactly do I mean by “dirty jokes”? Do I mean jokes with foul language? Sexual content? Something else? Once again, if I do a study and find that people are quite tolerant of dirty jokes and allow a dozen to be told before saying “enough”, and another researcher finds the number to be much lower (say three), it doesn’t necessarily mean one of us did a poor study. Even if we both did the study in the same situation, with the same types of people, we might find different results if we defined “dirty jokes” differently. And while we could probably think of multiple good definitions of “dirty joke”, some definitions are better than others. If, in my study, I defined “dirty jokes” as jokes about dirt and mud, then that could be a big reason for my different results; the way I defined the construct “dirty joke” was not very accurate, so the construct validity is low.

If this is your idea of a "dirty joke", you should check out Sesame Street's True Mud sketch.
Finally, statistical conclusion validity refers to whether I used the statistics to analyze my data correctly. Probably most people are with me until this point in the validity lesson, because when I mention statistics, I see eyes start to glaze over. To put this in the most basic way, math has rules (in statistics, we call them assumptions, but they amount to the same thing). If we don’t follow those rules, we get the wrong answer, like if we start adding, subtracting, and multiplying a long string of numbers without following the proper order of operations (remember PEMDAS? - parentheses, exponents, multiplication, division, addition, subtraction; you have deal with numbers in parentheses before numbers outside, multiply numbers before you can divide, etc.). If a number has a decimal point in front of it, we can’t ignore it and pretend it’s a whole number, or if we’re told to add a negative number to a value, we can’t ignore the negative sign.  [And if you want to try to make the argument that negative numbers don't actually exist, so why should you have to learn to do math with them?, obviously you've never had student loans.]

The same thing can be said about statistics; if I ignore the rules on when I can use a specific statistical formula and use it anyway, my results could be incorrect. For example, one assumption of many tests is that the dependent variable (the outcome) is normally distributed (i.e., the “bell curve” - this is why, in any stats class, the normal distribution is one of the first things you learn; it’s the underlying assumption of most of the tests you learn in those classes). If we want to use one of those tests, and our dependent variable is skewed, we may draw the wrong conclusion from our results.

Of course, even if you do a study in the best, most controlled, most accurate way possible, you might still draw the wrong conclusion. Sometimes weird stuff happens: even with random assignment, we might have some weird fluke where all the people with good senses of humor end up in one group. Or I might do the study on my family on a really good day, when they’re willing to hear way more dirty jokes than they would on any other day, meaning my results are not just limited to my particular family, but to my family on a very special kind of day. This is why we keep studying a topic, even if many others have already studied it. And we can’t just limit ourselves to one type of research, such as lab studies with lots of control and random assignment to groups. If you study a topic in many different ways (lab studies, observational studies, interviews) and find generally the same results in all of them, we can be even more certain our conclusions are accurate, and that we’ve gotten to close to finding that elusive concept of truth. And recognize that things can go wrong. It’s not the end of the world; just keep studying and have a good sense of humor.

Thoughtfully yours,
~Sara

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Dr. Pepper Ten: The Product is “Not for Women”, But the Commercials Are

No doubt, you’ve seen and heard about Dr. Pepper’s new soda, Dr. Pepper Ten, a low-calorie beverage that, unlike diet sodas, uses real sugar. And you’ve probably heard their commercials that feature manly men talking about action movies, duct tape, and bacon.

Mmmm, bacon…

Sorry, where was I? Oh, yes, the commercials. The purpose of the testosterone-infused advertising is in response to research showing that men are not interested in drinking diet sodas because they are perceived as being “girly” (find out more here). This soda was also developed to be a low-calorie option that didn’t taste like diet soda, because many people have issues with the taste of artificially sweetened beverages.

Word. There are few flavors in this world I dislike as much as artificial sweetener.

So in order to cater to men who want a diet beverage they can feel comfortable drinking with the guys, Dr. Pepper created Ten and created ads (likely spending millions of dollars on said ad campaign) that focus on men.

But they don't.

Listen to the ads. They’re always addressing women, without any statements toward men. Rather than saying, “Hey guys, want a beverage that recognizes your desire to be calorie conscious without all the estrogen? Try Dr. Pepper Ten.”, they start out the ads with, “Ladies…” and go on to explain to women why this beverage isn’t for them.

“Hey, ladies! This soda? Not for you…
 Wait, where are you going? I wasn’t finished explaining why this soda isn’t for you.”

Perhaps the aim is to remind guys of their days building clubhouses with their friends and putting up the “No girls allowed” sign (rather than a “Boys only” sign, which would have made a lot more sense). It’s also possible that the goal is to get women interested in trying the soda, because of the way people respond to being told not to do something. Specifically, they may be trying to elicit psychological reactance.

Humans are motivated to believe they have free will, as in control over their actions (whether you actually have free will – well, that’s something philosophers have been arguing about forever, so we won’t even go there right now). When someone tells you not to do something, your free will is threatened, and so you will behave in a way to reaffirm your sense of free will; the best way to do that is to do the thing you were just told not to do.

Parents are very familiar with this concept.

And I’ll admit, one thing that really drives me nuts is being told I am not allowed to do something or am even incapable of doing something (especially things that are learned) by virtue of my genitalia. Because apparently, the ability to change my oil, troubleshoot my computer, and hammer a nail are tied to the Y chromosome. “No point in teaching a woman to do any of those things. She’d never be able to learn it. So I’m going to avoid teaching her those things just to prove my point.” <sarcasm>Wow, your logic is infallible.</sarcasm… for now>

There’s a reason that social scientists insist on using the term “gender” in research. It’s not that we have an aversion to the word “sex”; it’s that we recognize “sex” is a biological term, whereas “gender” is a social term. Yes, because I am a woman, I have been shaped to behave in certain ways and believe certain things (and this perspective is also why I’m writing this blog entry and focusing on these issues). At the same time, I have my own unique set of traits, abilities, beliefs, and attitudes that were shaped by a variety of factors, not just the fact that I am a woman. The same is true for everyone; we were all shaped to be the way we are by our unique experiences, and throwing us all into one big category doesn’t make us all the same. Just like calling a calorie “manly” doesn’t make it so.

My point is that, perhaps they’re posting the “No Girls Allowed” sign while secretly hoping the girls will come around. And if that were my only reaction to Dr. Pepper Ten, I might just say, “What the heck, I’ll try it.”

After all, torque is a rather fascinating word.

There’s more to it than that, of course. Not only is Dr. Pepper Ten dragging out every gender stereotype possible, which has some documented effects on women’s performance in certain domains (see previous post), this issue of diet soda and gender has many more ramifications.

One of the reasons diet soda is so popular with women is because of our society’s focus on women’s bodies and the stigma associated with female overweight and obesity.

What stigma are men concerned about? Apparently, being seen drinking diet soda in public.

Forgive me if I’m not feeling too sympathetic, guys.

In all seriousness, I know that body image is also a serious concern for men, and have known more than one man who developed an eating disorder in response to pressures to look a certain way. Even so, women are constantly bombarded with messages to be thin, not just through the media, but in the fashion world overall. Clothing is often designed with thinner women in mind, and simply sized up to fit larger women; of course, the styles that look good on thinner women often differ from styles that look good on larger women, so this “sizing up” doesn’t necessarily allow women in larger sizes to look, and more importantly feel, good. And the messages come from our peers, too, even other women, who are often the worst offenders in making women feel bad about how they look.

I’d like to take a moment to thank those people who go out of their way to make me feel fat. At the very least, you’ve proven to me that being thin doesn’t make you happy or a good person.

And honestly, research has shown that no one really likes the word “diet”. In fact, some weight management programs are exploring new titles, like “wellness-focused”, and finding that people still have positive weight loss outcomes without needing to include words like “diet” and “weight”. Dr. Pepper Ten could probably still be a successful beverage because it doesn’t use words like diet, instead focusing on being a lower-calorie alternative that (presumably) tastes like a non-diet drink.

But at the end of the day, what Dr. Pepper Ten’s advertising makes me think of – besides, “Come on, aren’t we all smarter than this?” – is the Monty Python “Lumberjack” song, where the manly lumberjack suddenly discusses how much he enjoys wearing high heels and a bra. Yeah, the Dr. Pepper Ten commercials are just like that except, you know, not nearly as funny.

Men: I’m interested in hearing what you think about Ten, and what you think about an advertising campaign that is supposed to be all about you without actually addressing you directly. Does their need to preface words like “calories” with “manly” make any difference? Or do you find the commercials as idiotic and irritating as I?

Thoughtfully yours,
~Sara

Monday, January 2, 2012

An Open Letter to Calphon: The Importance of Operational Definitions

Dear Calphon,

I've been using your products ever since I received a set of Calphon pots and pans as a wedding present, about a year and a half ago. Though there are many things about your products to love - attractive, interchangeable lids to fit every sauce pan and skillet, oven safe - the "non-stick" aspect is laughable. Not only do I have to use obscene amounts of olive oil to prevent my food from enacting a death grip to your product, even then, the food is practically pulled apart as I try to pry it off.

Now, I was about to just post a snarky message on Facebook about the lack of non-stick on a non-stick product and leave it at that, but realized that there must be a logical explanation for the problems I'm having with your product. And, as I thought about it scientifically, I realized what we have here is a difference in operational definitions.

"Operational definitions?", you say, "What are those?" Allow me to explain.

Operational definitions are definitions that allow a concept to measured or manipulated. In research, especially social science research, we often try to study variables that are elusive, like love, intelligence, and aggression. We can't simply hold a ruler up to someone and say, "Their love score is 18." We have to define how we will determine a person's "love score", or IQ, or whatever we're studying, whether that be through a standardized measure, observation of behavior, or some other way. In fact, if you look around, operational definitions are everywhere, because we regularly measure things, even outside of research, that must first be defined.

For example, everyone who lives in the state of Illinois can tell you the operational definition of "intoxicated".

Look familiar?
The signs are posted on highways throughout the state, so we know that the operational definition of intoxicated in Illinois is a blood alcohol level of .08 or higher (and currently, that's the legal limit in all US states, though in the past, there have been some differences in how states have defined intoxicated).

There are other operational definitions floating around out there. For example, the Seinfeld episode in which the gang debated whether soup was a meal involved a discussion of what is (and is not) a meal. And many people have debated what makes something a "date" - for example, what activities should be involved, who should pay, time of day, and so on. Ever been to a social gathering and heard someone say, "This isn't a party. It's not a party unless…"? Those are operational definitions.

A good operational definition should be clear enough that anyone can walk in to your study (or conversation) and, based on the established definition, correctly identify a specific case. Of course, people may disagree on what makes a good operational definition - this is why operational definitions should be discussed and established before beginning a study. And for many variables, there are any number of operational definitions.

For example, blood alcohol level is one way to define intoxicated, but you could also have gone with ability to walk a straight line or say the alphabet backwards. Different operational definitions, however, may cause you come to different conclusions. A person may be classified as intoxicated if they are unable to walk a straight line but sober if their blood alcohol level is .02. (And by knowing the two pieces of information - unable to walk a straight line but blood alcohol level of .02 - we can come to a different conclusion: sober but uncoordinated.)

And this is where our misunderstanding comes from, Calphon. We have different operational definitions of non-stick. Mine is probably something like this:

Non-stick = Food can be removed with no pieces being ripped off

Yours must be something like this:

Non-stick = Food can be removed with great effort and large pieces being ripped off, so that my beautiful goat cheese-stuffed chicken breast looks more like chicken and goat cheese cobbler

See the problem? So based on my definition, your pan would not be considered non-stick, but based on your definition, it would. This is the problem with using undefined words like "non-stick". Now I'm wondering about that whole "oven-safe" bit. There probably isn't any room on your packaging to offer a good operational definition of your terms, but that's all right; you're more than welcome to put that information on your website. It would be most appreciated!

Thoughtfully yours,
~Sara

Friday, December 30, 2011

"That's Not Fair": Sushi, Notions of Justice, and Student Grades

Since human beings first developed the ability to speak, one of the most frequently uttered phrases has to be “Not fair!” Fairness is such a basic concept, even small children (and people who just behave like small children) discuss it at length. Like many topics I discuss on this blog, notions of what is fair and unfair are largely shaped by our experiences. In fact, even the idea of “fair” is a social one. There’s really no way to divorce fairness from the social context - it is a core component in all social interactions. Even so, people have different ideas of what is (and is not) fair. I was thinking about this the other day, as my husband and I were sharing a sushi roll.

This very special roll - dubbed the 2012 roll (Happy New Year, by the way!) - contained yellow tail, asparagus, “special” seaweed paper, and various sauces, and each of the 8 pieces were topped with one of 4 kinds of fish roe: masago, red tobiko, black tobiko (my favorite), and green tobiko. I figured: 4 kinds of roe, 8 pieces - enough for us to each have 4, one with each kind of roe. So when my husband just starts picking up pieces without regard to the fact that he just grabbed a second red one, my first thought was, “Hey, not fair!”

And right after I think this - and say, “Dude, you already had a red one.” - I stop and consider, “Why is this idea of equality so important to me? It’s just sushi.”

While justice can be evaluated differently by different people, based on their perspective, research on justice shows that there is some consensus in how people evaluate justice. There are two (possibly three) overarching perspectives that people might use at different times, and that fit into the different theoretical frameworks: distributive justice, procedural justice, and (possibly) interactional justice.

Adam Smith’s social exchange theory, which inspired some of the earliest research on distributive justice, states that people evaluate fairness of an outcome by creating a ratio of outputs to inputs (basically, how much work I had to do and how much I got in return), then comparing that ratio to the ratio of another’s outputs to inputs. If the evaluator’s ratio is equal to the comparison ratio, then the outcome is fair. Smith stated, however, that this process is still subjective, and that many biases can influence the values in one’s own ratio and in the comparison other’s ratio, especially because we may have really skewed ideas of how much work another person puts in.

Find a funnier cartoon?!  I don't have time for anything but Google Image search.
 In general, distributive justice deals with what types of distributions of outcomes will be perceived to be fair. There are three different rules that can be applied when distributing outcomes among parties. Fairness of the outcome is determined by the rule applied. The first is equality, in which each party receives an equal share. The second is equity, where an individual party’s share is based on the amount of input from that party; this is sometimes referred to as the merit rule, and is based on social exchange theory. Finally, the last rule is need, where share is based on whether the party has a deficit or has been slighted in some other distribution.

The preferred rule is influenced by many things, including the goals of the distribution. Equality is often chosen when group harmony is the goal. Equity rules are preferred when the goal is to maximize contributions. Need rules are used when group welfare is a concern, or when resources are limited. The context of the distribution can also have an influence. If outcomes are distributed publicly, the equality rule is usually preferred, while outcomes distributed privately often lead to use of the equity rule. The degree to which the perceiver contributes (or believes he contributes) can also influence preference; high contributors prefer equity and low contributors prefer equality.

Distributive justice was the major justice construct until the mid-1970’s, when procedural justice was introduced. Fans of procedural justice argue that people prefer fair procedures because they believe they will lead to fair outcomes, and that as long as people believe the process of allocating resources was fair, they’ll be fine with the outcome. Any teachers out there can probably tell you this is not always the case.

"I showed up.  That should be worth at least a B, right?"
In fact, not all researchers agree that procedural justice is more important in evaluating justice. Hegtvedt (2006 - an excellent book chapter on justice frameworks, which you can read here) argues that procedural justice may only appear to be more highly valued because 1) procedures are easily interpreted and 2) individuals may lack the information necessary to compare outcomes across group members. When outcome information is available, people will focus more on that information.

Some people have identified another type of justice called interactional justice. Interactional justice is made up of two parts: Interpersonal justice is the degree of respect and dignity demonstrated in the procedure, and informational justice is the sharing of information on process and the distribution of outcomes. Bies and Shapiro (1987 - abstract here), for example, refer to the journal peer review process as an example of how lack of interactional justice can influence whether the outcome is perceived to be fair. Such processes are often lengthy and the responses from reviewers, condescending (see previous post). Some people call the process, and the outcome, unfair, while others do not. The authors argue that the difference in responses could be due to the explanations offered by editors; if editors provide a good reason for the delay and reviewers’ responses, authors may believe they have been treated fairly.  Of course, the reason that some argue there are only two justice perspectives is because they believe interactional justice is simply a subdivision of procedural justice.

Anyway, my husband and I ended up evenly dividing the sushi, though he told me later he would have happily traded two black tobiko rolls for two red. Bartering, hmm? Another post, another day.

Thoughtfully yours,
~Sara

Thursday, November 24, 2011

On Thanksgiving and Gratitude

Every year on Thanksgiving, we are called to give thanks for the good things we have... and of course, gorge on lots of food. I'll resist the urge to write about overeating and focus instead on what the holiday is really about: gratitude.

Though in the past, the field of psychology has focused on maladaptive behavior, the expansion of various subfields of psychology beyond clinical psychology has led to the study of a variety of behaviors, both good and bad, and to focus on, not only the things that make us mentally ill, but the things that make us healthy, happy, and fulfilled. The study of gratitude is one area studied by so-called positive psychologists.

There are certainly individual differences in ability to feel gratitude; some people are simply more grateful than others. (You can find out more about your "trait gratitude" by taking this measure). But social situations, like Thanksgiving, can also influence your minute-to-minute levels of gratitude (or "state gratitude").

Gratitude, unsurprisingly, is strongly associated with psychological well-being, happiness, and life satisfaction (find two full articles about this here and here). Feeling gratitude reduces stress and positive coping; these positive benefits are observed even when people are randomly assigned to an intervention meant to increase their gratitude (read one such experiment here), meaning that these benefits can be reaped by anyone, not just people are are "naturally grateful".

Being the target of gratitude is also beneficial. Being told "thank you" makes a person more likely to repeat the behavior in the future, probably because it functions as a reward (and as I've said before, if a behavior is rewarded, it's more likely to occur again). So even if you feel like someone is "just doing their job", saying "thank you" can make him or her feel more motivated to repeat that behavior in the future and will likely improve your future interactions with that person, as well.

So keep feeling that gratitude, today and everyday - it's good for you. Happy Thanksgiving everyone!

Thoughtfully yours,
Sara